Introduction
The original motivation for this study was a debate in an established worker co-operative seeking to invest in product development. Its constitution prevented it from applying for loan-funding from a Government scheme even though the scheme included co-operatives as a target group. Fund managers would not loan monies to any organisation unless it was able to convert loan repayments into equity capital in cases of default. In 2008, during the delivery of third sector governance seminars at Sheffield Hallam University, a consultant claimed that 40 (of 2700) CICs had applied to deregister after experiencing problems with their asset lock. These comments prompted discussion of the original research and led the author to read more widely on alternative ownership models for social enterprise. As a result, this paper updates previously published work (Ridley-Duff, 2002 ) by re-analysing findings and conducting further secondary research.
The next section presents an updated literature on co-operative models of ownership, and includes a meta-theoretical framework for understanding different forms of staff controlled co-operative social enterprises. A methodology section outlines the approach used to combine findings from the original study with more recent research. This is followed by a section presenting results from both the original study and further desk research. Discussion and conclusions provide insights into the likely success of the CIC as a choice for social enterprise development.
Forms of Co-operative Social Enterprise
Social enterprises adopting a co-operative, mutual or co-ownership approach change the relationship between owners, consumers and workers. This involves restructuring the organisation to erode the distinction between employer and employee, with the goal of eliminating wage-labour as the dominant mode of working life (ICA, 2005) . Alternatively, the relationship between retailer and consumer is restructured so that consumers and/or producers have control over the enterprise and supply chain (Woodin, 2007) .
These practices can be motivated by ideological, empirical or pragmatic considerations. Ideological motivations are premised on a moral commitment to fairness at work, often underpinned by empirical studies that theorise how ownership combined with effective participation improves the double-bottom line (Ellerman, 1990; Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Bradley and Taylor, 1992; Oakeshott, 2000; Conyon and Freeman, 2001; Jensen, 2006; Erdal, 2008) . Pragmatic motivations, on the other hand, involve the use of co-operative laws to obtain legal and social advantages (Paton, 1989) . For example, Howarth's (2007) study of co-operatives in Argentina found that choices were influenced by the rapid communication of legal rights within established social networks. A co-operative's ability to apply to a local court for permission to use idle company equipment for up to two years (to facilitate the transfer of assets from bankrupt companies) spurred trade unionists to recommend the co-operative form when members were threatened by a business closure.
In the last decade, model company rules have become available that allow social enterprises to separate voting rights and equity, or adopt structures reflecting a range of interests (Spear, 2001; Brown, 2006) . In the UK, the founders of Democratic Business Ltd fuelled the debate about the role of equity with a series of publications between 1996 and 2000 (Major, 1996 (Major, , 1998 Major and Boby, 2000) . Their enthusiasm coincided with the publication of The Ownership Solution (Gates, 1998) which Brown (2006) has interpreted for the social enterprise movement. In ideological terms, this gave a new impetus for pluralist thinking on ownership, governance and management control, igniting fresh debates on the merits of stakeholder involvement (Sternberg, 1998; Vinten, 2005 ) and the form this should take in social enterprises (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2007) .
Historically, perceptions of co-operatives have been negatively influenced by prominent figures on both wings of the political divide. Marx (1984: 440) commented, "they naturally reproduce in their actual organisation all the shortcomings of the prevailing [capitalist] system" and this encouraged left-wing parties to argue that political activity should concentrate on the working class. Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1914 Webb ( , 1921 ) also adopted the view that co-ops would always suffer from worker-indiscipline and poor management. Rothschild and Allen Whitt (1986) not unreasonably criticise the Webbs for failing to support their claims with empirical evidence, and when Cornforth et al. (1988) examined the failure and survival rates of British co-ops between 1978-1986, they found relatively good performance compared to the private sector (compare Paton, 1989; Holmstrom, 1993) . Spear (1999) charts how the deregulation of public services led to a thaw in trade union hostility toward co-operatives and employee-buyouts. In some cases, they acted more like their continental and South American counter-parts by playing a lead role in their creation (Patton, 1989; Howarth, 2007) . Deregulation, unfortunately, also provided opportunities for careerists and private speculators. Cook et al. (2002) tracks the legislative changes that allowed "carpetbaggers" to cash in on building society demutualisation as well as the subsequent period in the 1990s when career-oriented executives benefited from promoting the sale of demutualised societies to private banks.
The UK Context
It is appropriate to ask 'why has development in the UK differed significantly from the rest of the EU? ' Between 1970 and , the most influential organisation promoting and servicing worker co-ops was the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM) 1 . Established in 1971, model rules were produced in 1976. Over ten years, this triggered the creation of 1176 co-ops employing 6,900 people -an average of six staff per co-op (Cornforth et al, 1988) . In contrast, ten years after the constitution of the Spanish Mondragon co-ops was regularised (around 1960), 48 co-ops were created employing 8,570 people (averaging 179 staff). When it is considered that the Mondragon region is just half the size of Wales, the gap in achievement is apparent (Oakeshott, 1990) . One common explanation is that members' capital investments finance the co-operatives, while a share of surpluses and welfare benefits accrue to individual members. Unlike co-operatives in the UK which favour community over individual ownership, the Mondragon system builds in explicit benefits and substantial profit-sharing arrangements that provide for the long-term welfare needs of members, their families and the wider community (see Oakeshott, 1990; Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Turnbull, 1995; Lezamiz, 2003) .
In the UK, although there is no specific company law covering co-ops, ownership structures have usually been based on Industrial and Provident Society model rules (IPS). After serving a probationary period, worker-members pay £1 for a share. When they leave, they give up their share. Not only is external share-ownership prohibited, each member's share cannot accrue in value, and the member cannot gain financially from the sale of business assets. ICOM had a virtual monopoly on registering UK co-ops as common ownerships until the late 1980s. In 1988, the Employee Share Ownership Centre (ESOC) was established. By 2000, the ESOC (2000) claimed that 2,000 companies had created employee ownership share plans (ESOPs), including 80% of the top 1500 quoted companies. These involve over Major (1996 Major ( , 1998 researched the various problems faced by co-ops and ESOPs in the USA and contended that most suffer from 'equity degeneration' -a situation where one or more stakeholder is unable to realise the full-value of their past efforts, risk-taking, investments and decisions. Expanding a theme propounded by Ellerman (1990) , he argued that ownership and control were not inextricably linked and that rules with two types of shareVoting Shares and Value Added Shares -could effectively separate ownership rights from voting rights. This approach, however, has proved less popular than one promoted by the Baxi Partnership and Employee Ownership Association (EOA) (see Erdal, 2008: Chapter 17) . Based on US-style leveraged employee-buyouts (Rodrick, 2005) with Mondragon-type democratic controls, private sector companies and common-ownership co-operatives are converted to majority employee-owned companies. The system uses a profitable track record and growing asset base to secure loans that establish an employee-benefit trust which can acquire the business (compare Spear, 1999) . Initially, at least 50% (+1) of shares are held in the EBT with subsequent annual surpluses distributed through an ESOP to individual share accounts. Providing 50% (+1) remain in trust and there is an embedded mechanism issuing new shares to employee accounts, a profitable company cannot be acquired by outside investors against the wishes of the trustees (employees).
This combination of collective and individual ownership has attracted both Sunderland Home Care Associates (SHCA) and Eaga Ltd (see www.employeeownership.co.uk). In 1998, SCHA converted from a £1 per member common ownership model to a combined EBT / ESOP model. In 2006, its steady growth and business performance in social care led to recognition when they won 'top social enterprise' at the UK's 2006 Enterprising Solutions Awards (EOA, 2008) . Since 2004, they have replicated the model in three other regions and added a further £3.2m to the group's turnover (Higgins, 2007) .
The various cooperative forms of social enterprise, therefore, can be summarised as shown in Figure 1 . (Anon, 2007) . The frequency this body meets varies with size. In the small co-ops, all workers can meet weekly: large co-ops may convene only once a year. Regardless of whether co-ops are commonly or individually owned, they frequently develop what Oakeshott (1990:155) has called 'the classic co-operative control structure'. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2 . Suma, in Halifax (England), resisted the tendency towards an elected policy-making body. In the early 1980s, it started experimenting with collective forms that devolved decision-making powers to smaller autonomous groups (ICOM, 1989) . Initially, they divided the General Meeting into two groups -personnel and finance -a system that evolved into a 'doughnut' model with autonomous groups free to organise day-to-day activities including recruitment, scheduling and business development. By 1988, Suma had grown to more than 40 so the General Meeting was abandoned in favour of 3 'sectors', each with representatives elected to a central co-ordinating body nicknamed the 'hub' (Cornforth, 1995) . In the early 1990s, each sector met weekly to discuss issues facing the business and then took views to hub meetings for decision. Co-ordination was achieved through a business plan, departmental budgeting, and an elected position of 'sector co-ordinator'.
The significance of Suma's structure is that policy formation and operational management was devolved (close to product and service delivery), while policy decisions were conceded to an elected body (see Figure 3) . As a whole, the structure maintained the participative character of collectives, rather than the predominantly top-down representative models outlined by Oakeshott (1990) . This might seem like an isolated diversion but for the fact that the doughnut model coincided with Suma's growth. By 1993 the structure supported over 60 staff, and by 2000 over 90 (Warburton, 2000) . By 2004, however, some elements of the 'classic' model had been re-adopted. Elected "sector co-ordinators" had been replaced by appointed "functional co-ordinators". These were described by the hub chair as part-time managers accountable through regular member surveys appraising their performance. The balance of their time was allocated to non-managerial warehouse duties to keep them connected to practical business issues. General Meetings were also reintroduced, this time enforced by new rules requiring attendance (Cannell, 2004) . Certainly, it appears that there is a stronger dependency between company rules and access to finance than company rules and management practices. Considering the variety of management styles in use, it is reasonable to suggest that growth and viability does not depend on conventional business practices, providing solutions encourage high levels of participation and formally delegated decision-making powers (compare Paton, 2003) . Fieldwork, therefore, was designed to explore whether the link between company rules and access to finance is a more significant factor in the growth of co-operative social enterprises than management structure.
Research Methodology
This exploratory study was conducted using telephone interviews. In 2000, twenty organisations were selected by working alphabetically through a directory of co-ops and employee-owned businesses (provided by Major, 2000) . All came from London and Home Counties (total population 84) to ensure a balanced sample of non-equity and equity co-ops from a single geographical location. Even so, as it was not possible to select all organisations from a single industry, each was screened to ensure income was derived from "professional services". This screened out manufacturing organisations to limit variability.
With the exception of the researcher's own company, the size of each was not known beforehand. An attempt was made to obtain data on turnover and expenditure from public records but this was not always available. Obtaining financial data in test interviews proved impractical and unreliable so the questionnaire was amended to obtain a verbal assessment of turnover and staff changes in the last 5 years.
Semi-structured telephone interviews (up to 40 minutes long) were used to collect both quantitative and qualitative data from a final sample of 11 companies, with one answering the questionnaire by e-mail. It was subsequently found that two organisations were non-profit making: these have been excluded from the results to leave a final sample comprising ten service-based "more than profit" co-operative social enterprises from a single region. There were an equal number of non-equity co-ops (prevented by their rules from issuing "ordinary shares") and equity co-ops (offering shares that carry voting rights and dividend entitlements).
The interview focussed on decisions involving significant expenditure. Each organisation was asked to explain how proposals were put forward, the forum(s) in which they were discussed, and which person or body had final decision-making authority. A range of qualitative data was collected about trading conditions, special constraints and any triggers for expansion and contraction. To examine long-term outcomes, four companies (two equitybased, two non-equity) were selected for a follow up investigation in 2008 using public (secondary) sources. In all cases, multiple sources were used to check claims including: web-articles; Companies House records; news reports; company web-sites and annual reports. To honour the original commitment to confidentiality, company names and sources have been withheld.
Results
In 2000, five cases (A -E) were constituted with common ownership rules as Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLG). These issue £1 shares to members upon completion of a probationary period. Members give up the share upon leaving. The share does not accrue in value or entitle the member to the company's profits or assets (upon liquidation). Profits can be distributed in the form of bonuses. The other five cases (F -J) were constituted as Companies Limited by Share (CLS). Two used model ICOM rules that allowed shareholding, either through an employee trust or direct investment. While entitling the shareholder to a proportion of profits, shares did not confer ownership rights or accrue in value. The other three businesses used internally devised rules to issue tradable shares. In these three cases, the formal board included members of staff elected by the workforce: participative management practices (staff teams) were in operation in all co-ops. Shares in these companies could rise and fall in value. A summary of the sample is given in Figure 4 . Companies A-E are 'equity' co-operatives (* indicates variable yield equity); companies F-J are common ownership 'non-equity' co-operatives. The following results were published with the original study (see Ridley-Duff, 2002) . All 'equity' co-operatives had formally elected boards that discharged functions outside member meetings (in two cases, this was only to satisfy formal requirements of company law). In three of the 'non-equity' co-operatives, no separate directors meeting took place. Another noteworthy difference was a flexible approach by non-equity co-operatives to the payment of fees to members. In three cases, operations oscillated between a quasi-wages system and the payment of professional fees. Co-op I always paid fees to members, while co-op H used a similar system in its early years. In contrast, all 'employee-owned' organisations operated a payroll for 'employees'. One interesting variation of this is case B where staff worked the first two months without pay to 'earn their equity'. There is more evidence of delegation of authority amongst the equity co-ops (A -E). Table 3 in the original study (Ridley-Duff, 2002:77) calculated the average age of equity-based co-operatives to be 7 years compared to 14 years for common ownerships. The average size was 36 in equity co-ops compared to 11 for common ownerships. It is noteworthy that two equity co-ops (B and E) allowed staff teams to take the lead role in the creation and development of proposals. These cases indicate a different approach to organisation compared to other co-ops in the sample. Finally, tables 8 and 9 in the original study (Ridley-Duff, 2002: 80-81) show verbal assessments of changes in turnover and staff numbers: these had risen faster in equity coops than common ownerships over the previous 5 years. These assessments were checked against background information to see if 'objective' data supported the claims. Discussions yielded some rich qualitative data. One non-equity co-op (G) was happy with (even proud of) their size and structure and always used cash reserves/profits for expenditure. In the follow up study, company G had grown from 9 to 12 staff: its website confirmed that it remains employee owned and controlled. Two others (F and H) had periods where members limited growth aspirations, recognising that growth would bring changes that few members wanted. One (F) preferred to handle busy periods by contracting freelance staff, rather than recruiting more members. (Michels, 1961) can be reversed by democratic 'renewal' (Cornforth, 1995) .
Figure 4 -Characteristics of Selected Companies

Three co-ops (originally 'non-equity') working with new technology experienced problems obtaining investment funding (cases D, H and J). The first (D) converted to a company limited by shares (CLS
Non-equity co-ops (cases F and H) had been unable to obtain loans or overdrafts without personal guarantees. Equity co-ops (C, and the spin-off enterprise from H) found it much easier to obtain bank loans at low rates of interest after members made personal investments. However, there was one notable exception: co-op (E) had rules that prevented the issue of external equity and did not require up-front investment from members (having used an EBT / ESOP to acquire control). The bank was unhappy and made a loan application conditional on giving personal guarantees. It made clear that it disapproved of plans to issue equity to all staff, and formally advised distributing shares only to managers (the same advice was given to H1 during its spin-off). Co-op E decided against the bank loan and, within 5 years, traded its way out of debt, tripling staff numbers (to 105) and increasing profits ten-fold. Its longer-term fortunes, however, were more variable. Press reports indicate a problem that triggered the departure of 5 senior staff in 2002. Staff numbers quickly halved (to 50) and the founder also departed. Nevertheless, co-op E stabilised: press reports claim it had 55 staff in 2008, and the company's website claims staff still have equal shares. The governing body comprises a 5-person 'council' including two non-management staff elected by the workforce.
In extreme cases, members of non-equity co-ops felt trapped by their rules and expended considerable energy trying to work around them. Co-op J, for example, created a private limited company to prevent losing a customer that wished to invest in J's development. Later, this created new problems when auditors sought to prevent the transfer of assets (resulting in a rental arrangement for equipment). In another case (H), the non-equity cooperative created a second employee-owned business (H1) that had both internal and external shareholders while retaining a system of one-member one-vote on policy decisions. Although company (H1) later ceased trading, the original worker cooperative (H) survived and still trades. In 2007, however, the founder (approaching retirement) wrote to former members to announce plans to wind it up.
In contrast to these mixed experiences, the MD of one equity co-operative (B) recounted experiences working in the US. Equity was available to all staff but paid no dividend. Reinvestment was as high as possible with the aim of building the company (and its share value). In 7 years, shares increased from $10 to $135, and the business had a $5 billion turnover. For reasons that were not explained, the company was sold off (and run down) so he chose to sell his shares and invest £50,000 in a new UK-based employee-owned cooperative. Within two years it had eight staff and a turnover above £2 million.
The stronger employment performance of the equity co-ops that did not have common ownership rules should be noted here. The table below was included in the original study to show the employee-owned co-ops in a category of their own. This performance needs to be contextualized, however, with a cautionary note about drawing conclusions from such a small sample. Two of the employee-owned businesses inherited a favourable business environment, taking over existing customer-bases. In subsequent years, their performance was more variable so their growth potential is overstated (even if still relatively strong).
Discussion
How reliable is the data? We need to take into account several factors. Firstly, all the interviewees were senior staff and some were founder members. Their aspirations and values -typically to run businesses democratically -may have projected a more idealised picture of their workplace than would have been the case if, for example, new staff had been interviewed (see Ridley-Duff, 2005 ). Secondly, a major limitation is that only one person from each organisation was interviewed. However, the researcher found all the interviewees offered comments freely and never got the impression that relevant information was being withheld or distorted. Given the subject of the research, it was necessary to talk in the first instance to staff that had an understanding of the company's constitution, structure, decision-making process and financial performance. With regard to sample size, increasing it would have introduced more variables into the study (different locations, business types 2 ), which would have reduced the ability to examine the impact of company rules specifically.
There is one immediate question regarding the 'outlier' cases (case D with 50 staff, and Case E with 105). Should these be excluded? Given their history, the answer is definitely 'no'. In case D, the organisation struggled to grow beyond 15-20 staff when using ICOM / CLG rules. To move beyond this size, and secure investment, a corporate structure was created using an EBT, a new trading company and a private sector partner. The switch to tradable equity, therefore, was considered a necessary step to re-capitalise the business. In case E, the original spin off company had only 30 staff (smaller than at least one of the ICOM companies, which grew to 36 staff before shrinking back to 10). In this case, the growth was attributed to the company design based on an EBT and profit-sharing trust which provided a powerful incentive for increased productivity and profitability. Without this, individuals could not acquire individual shareholdings in the new company and provide for their long-term future security. Their size, therefore, is attributable -at least in part -to the company rules selected, not just the management style adopted.
Nevertheless, the following analysis should be approached with caution: results are suggestive, not conclusive.
Rules and Management Structure
Tables 2, 4 and 5 gave clues to the different approaches taken to management. Table 2 shows that all equity co-ops delegate authority to make expenditure, and most use annual budgeting as an aid to authorising as well as controlling expenditure. In contrast only one (the largest) non-equity co-operative used a similar approach, with the rest requiring group approval for almost all expenditure.
Tables 4 and 5 summarised the main attributes of proposal making and decision-making. Two of the fastest growing businesses (both employee-owned businesses) typically initiated proposals at the lowest level -the staff-team -and only required approval of one other person (a director or senior manager). All the equity co-ops based on common ownership rules had a formal management body (a General Council / Meeting) that needed to reach its own consensus. While this could be a function of size, even the smallest equity co-ops used a formally recognised manager while common ownerships twice their size did not.
Is there a link between these approaches and business development? The data suggests there is, but it is difficult to draw a direct relationship between the two. Some common ownerships (cases G and H) had a cautious approach to growth, but this did not hold across the sample. It is worth recalling Suma's management structure here. Its defining characteristic (for a period in the 1990s) was devolved proposal-making and operational responsibility with final approval sought from (an elected) management. What we can say with certainty is that there is a qualitative difference between the approach to decision-making in the businesses that have grown larger (including Suma). The focus is on experienced staff nurturing good proposals (and screening out bad ones) usually initiated at team level. As Suma is itself based on common ownership rules (ICOM, 1987 , Appendix 1), it cannot be said that common ownership necessarily results in a top-heavy management system. The higher incidence of centralised proposal-and decision-making in the common ownerships, however, does suggest that the rules encourage this.
Given the objective of participation and democratic decision-making in most (if not all) of these businesses, these findings question whether General Meetings actually produce the levels of participation and self-governance that is desired. The evidence, supported in the literature on mentoring and coaching, indicates that devolved decision-making driven by individuals in staff-teams, guided by experienced leaders, is a more effective way to secure active participation in organisation development (Clutterbuck & Megginson, 2005) .
Rules and Access to Finance
It was suggested earlier that the link between company rules, access to finance and growth may be a strong one. Table 10 shows that equity-based co-ops took on an average of 5 staff a year, nearly 10 times the rate of non-equity co-ops. After follow up research, it is clear the difference is overstated but still substantial. Other evidence is now available. Firstly, the cases of Sunderland Care Home Associates and Eaga Ltd (www.employeeownership.co.uk) provide further evidence of rapid growth after a switch away from common ownership to an EBT/ESOP model. Further evidence comes from a study of 300 companies by Conyon and Freeman (2001) that was not available in 2000. This study found a 20% productively improvement in private sector organisations that combined employee-ownership and participative management, compared to ownership or participation alone. Lastly, there is the evidence presented to the All Party Parliamentary Group for Employee Ownership indicating a broadening of employee-ownership sector. None of the sample chose the reverse route (changing from a CLS to a CLG) for any reason, although case (D) split off from a CLS to form a consumer co-operative based on the IPS model revised in 2002. In only two cases (F and G) was a CLG considered desirable as a long-term organisational form. In the other three cases, the CLG was considered an obstacle to growth whether desired (as in case H) or the result of market pressures (as in case J).
However, it is by no means clear that external equity is either necessary or advantageous. While there are examples of companies in the sample growing rapidly as a result of converting or creating companies to receive external investment, the most remarkable growth is in an EBT/ESOP that issued only internal equity. This mirrors the case of SHCA, and lends support to Cornforth et al. (1988) who found that building the strength of internal revenue streams can be more effective than seeking external investment. However, tables 6 and 7 suggest that, while companies of both types prefer to use cash reserves and profits to fund equipment expenditure, equity is useful to fund expansion if legal mechanisms ensure that the social structure of the company can be protected. With the follow up research, it is clear that external funding brings significant risks. However, where this is organised through establishment of an EBT / ESOP rather than an external shareholding, the signs are that it provides a more stable transition to employee-ownership.
Can we generalise from these conclusions? The answer is a heavily qualified "Yes". The sample, while including some variability and being fairly small, was sufficiently well controlled to suggest further directions for research. We can, with some certainty, say that company rules do not directly influence management structure, but do encourage certain structures (particularly in the start up years). In saying this, it should be remembered that one non-equity co-op ignored its rules on voting rights, introduced a self-selecting board and fairly rigid top-down management (case J). Other companies that provided for voting according to share-allocation never voted on anything (cases A, B and E), adopting a consensus approach in all decision-making. Management style and structure is a matter of choice, whether the rules seek to influence them or not.
Finance is a different matter. The possibilities open to a business are intrinsically linked to both the company's own rules and the legal environment in which they operate. The evidence suggests that restrictions on the issue of equity have the potential to harm organisational development. This being the case, the choice of a CIC registered as a CLG is unlikely to be the optimum choice for social enterprises that wish to grow. While the evidence was inconclusive about whether external equity is necessary, the study suggests that equity in any form can help businesses develop faster because it encourages a creative attitude towards efficiencies as well as new options for collaborations and partnerships.
If growth is not desired, or the organisation delivers services that do not require large investments in technology, there is little need to structure the organisation so that it can issue equity. In this case, a CIC can be an appropriate form, although an IPS or Charitable Incorporated Organisation may also be appropriate. Small-scale service organisations with low investment needs can be well served by common ownership forms (and can still, if not a charity, introduce profit-sharing arrangements). It may even foster an egalitarian culture conducive to effective small team working. In this study, such organisations were able to meet investment needs from their own revenue streams (cases F and G).
Conclusions
The conclusions of this study suggest a course of action for staff controlled (worker) co-operatives. In addition, while the findings were not derived from voluntary organisations, charities or consumer co-operatives, the research indicates that staff participation combined with profit-sharing could provide benefits to a wider range of multi-stakeholder social enterprises. A worker co-operative with growth ambitions is better served by structuring itself as an employee-owned enterprise with rules that combine majority collective and minority individual equity ownership, rather than a common ownership co-operative based on either an IPS or CLG model. It helps if equity is allowed to vary in line with the fortunes of the company. While there is evidence that external equity is not necessary for rapid growth, it can play an important role in weathering a downturn in trade, assisting business development and expansion. It can also be a tool for cementing joint ventures with suppliers and customers.
One question that remains is whether a combined EBT/ESOP can sustain democratic organisation comparable to a common ownership co-operative. The evidence from this study is encouraging, with combined systems of collective and individual ownership ensuring overall control is not lost to outside interests. One-member, one-vote principles (at least at the level of the staff meeting) were in evidence and motivation levels may even be enhanced. Elected worker-directors were evident (and encouraged) in all the organisations that were equity based, but not in all common ownerships (see case J). Nevertheless, external financial pressures did trigger the break up of one organisation attempting change (case D) and another attempt failed to achieve sustainability after problems negotiating with a venture capital fund (case H1). Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that long-standing examples (such as John Lewis and Arup) use 100% collective ownership successfully, and that the consumer co-operative based on an IPS continues to develop and invest without the problems reported in this paper.
Asset locks, in most but not all cases, came to be regarded as a problem. Frequently, this understanding only developed in the wake of internal/external pressures for growth. This being the case, the CIC form -even in its CLS guise -may not be the optimum choice for staff-controlled social enterprises because it denies capital growth to the parties that create value. Both forms of CIC are designed to be redistributive, not distributive, and this weakens the case for it where staff are responding to their own disadvantages or low pay. The CIClike the pre-1997 IPS model deployed in ICOM worker co-operatives -may come to be seen as exploitative by shifting surpluses into indivisible capital reserves without adequately compensating entrepreneurial labour or making financial capital amenable to effective democratic control. Viable alternatives like the Spanish coops (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Holmstrom, 1993) , trade-union led ESOPs (Spear, 1999) or investor-led ESOPs (Erdal, 2008 ) merit active consideration.
The consumer co-operative model discovered in follow up research was unexpected, and offers a clear attraction. The surplus sharing arrangements reported in annual accounts stated that approximately 15% of profits were shared amongst employees, with dividends paid to members (i.e. the co-operative's customers) and an equal amount deposited in a social economy investment fund. This multi-stakeholder model is worthy of continued scrutiny as it offers a model for generating capital that can be invested in the social economy, whilst also attractive to workers and beneficiaries. Moreover, it appears to be an excellent model for competing with (or reforming) utility companies.
With regard to further research, there are three recommendations. Firstly, follow up studies with a larger sample, and which interview a wider range of staff, would be able to confirm whether the decision-making processes described here represent a reasonable reflection of practice elsewhere. Secondly, there appears to be a link between team-based decisions supported by experienced staff in a coaching (rather than managing) role and higher levels of staff participation and enterprise growth. This is worth a separate study, particularly in the light of a substantive literature outlining the arguments for team-based structures with supportive 'democratic' managers (Johnson, 2006) . Social enterprises, because they are relatively free from external financial interests, may prove the place where these management practices find the most fertile ground.
Lastly, it is apparent that common ownership and employee ownership are fundamentally different -although they can be combined effectively to achieve a partial asset lock and strong performance through surplus sharing mechanisms. Each give rise to different internal dynamics so a further comparative study, on a larger scale, would be able to account in more detail for differences in social and economic performance.
